Wu-Tang is for the Children! How State Laws Intended to Protect Children Raise Other Risks
This presentation analyzes the privacy and security implications of state-level legislation aimed at protecting minors online. It examines how laws like COPPA, KOSA, and the Age-Appropriate Design Code (AADC) introduce unintended risks, including increased data collection for age verification and potential First Amendment conflicts. The talk highlights the tension between regulatory efforts to enhance child safety and the resulting privacy trade-offs and censorship concerns.
The Privacy Paradox: How Age Verification Laws Create New Attack Surfaces
TLDR: State-level legislation like KOSA and COPPA 2.0 mandates strict age verification for online platforms, forcing companies to collect sensitive PII and biometric data. This shift creates a massive, centralized target for attackers, effectively trading user privacy for regulatory compliance. Security researchers and pentesters should pivot their focus toward these new identity-verification pipelines, which are now the most critical points of failure in modern web applications.
Legislators are currently obsessed with "protecting the children," but their approach is creating a security nightmare for everyone else. By mandating that platforms verify the age of their users, states are forcing companies to build massive, centralized databases of government-issued IDs, credit card numbers, and biometric data. For a security researcher, this is not a safety feature; it is a massive, high-value data lake waiting to be drained.
The Mechanics of Mandatory Data Collection
When a platform is legally required to verify that a user is over 17, they can no longer rely on simple self-attestation. They must implement robust verification, which usually involves one of three flawed methods: third-party identity providers, credit card authorization, or biometric age estimation.
Each of these methods introduces a new, high-risk attack surface. If a platform integrates with a third-party identity provider like Allastrust, they are essentially outsourcing their authentication security to a vendor. If that vendor has a misconfigured API or a weak token validation process, the platform’s entire user base is exposed.
Even worse is the trend toward biometric age estimation. Companies are now using camera-based facial analysis to guess a user's age. This requires the platform to process raw video or image data, often using third-party machine learning models. If you are testing an application that uses these features, look for the following:
- Insecure API Endpoints: Are the age verification results returned in the client-side response? Can you manipulate the JSON payload to bypass the check?
- Data Persistence: Does the application store the raw images or video frames used for biometric analysis? If so, is that data encrypted at rest, and who has access to the decryption keys?
- Vendor Integration: How does the application handle the callback from the identity provider? Is there a risk of Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) when retrieving the verification status?
The First Amendment and the Chilling Effect
Beyond the technical risks, these laws create a massive censorship risk. By requiring users to link their real-world identity to their online activity, these laws effectively kill anonymity. For a pentester, this means that the "user" you are simulating is no longer a generic account; it is a verified individual.
When you are performing a red team engagement, consider how these verification requirements change the threat model. If you can compromise the verification pipeline, you are not just gaining access to an account; you are potentially gaining access to the user's verified identity, which can be used for downstream attacks like account takeover or identity theft.
Why Current Regulations Fail
The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) was written in 1998, long before the modern era of data-hungry social media platforms and IoT devices. While the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has attempted to update these rules, the core problem remains: the law is trying to solve a 2024 problem with 1998 logic.
The Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) and COPPA 2.0 are essentially trying to force companies to become identity gatekeepers. This is a role that most tech companies are fundamentally unequipped to handle. When you look at the recent settlements involving Meta and TikTok, it is clear that even the largest companies struggle to protect the data they already have. Adding a mandate to collect even more sensitive information will only increase the frequency and severity of these breaches.
Defensive Strategies for the Modern Stack
If you are working with a blue team, your primary goal should be data minimization. If the law requires age verification, do not store the underlying PII. Use zero-knowledge proofs or cryptographic tokens that verify a user is over 17 without revealing their date of birth, name, or address.
If you must store identity data, treat it with the same level of security as a root CA key. Use hardware security modules (HSMs) for key management and ensure that all identity-related traffic is isolated from the main application network.
The reality is that these laws are not going away. As a researcher, you need to stop viewing them as policy issues and start viewing them as technical vulnerabilities. Every time a new law mandates a "safety" feature, it creates a new way for an attacker to bypass security controls or exfiltrate data. Your job is to find those paths before the bad guys do. Keep your focus on the data pipelines, the vendor integrations, and the authentication logic. That is where the next generation of high-impact bugs will be found.
Target Technologies
Up Next From This Conference

Breaking Secure Web Gateways for Fun and Profit

Listen to the Whispers: Web Timing Attacks That Actually Work

Abusing Windows Hello Without a Severed Hand
Similar Talks

Inside the FBI's Secret Encrypted Phone Company 'Anom'

Unmasking the Snitch Puck: The Creepy IoT Surveillance Tech in the School Bathroom

