Tracking the Invisible: How Public Data Feeds Compromise Operational Security

TLDR: This research demonstrates how combining disparate public data sources like ADS-B, AIS, and social media allows for the precise tracking of high-value targets, including private aircraft and maritime vessels. By correlating real-time signal data with social media activity, researchers can bypass traditional security measures and deanonymize individuals or assets. Pentesters should incorporate these OSINT workflows into their reconnaissance phases to identify physical security gaps and potential vectors for social engineering.

Modern reconnaissance is no longer just about scanning open ports or fuzzing web endpoints. The most effective intelligence gathering happens in the noise of public data feeds. When you look at the intersection of maritime tracking, flight telemetry, and social media, you stop seeing isolated data points and start seeing a complete operational picture. This talk at BSides Mumbai 2024 stripped away the complexity of these systems to show how easily an attacker can track high-value assets and individuals without ever touching a target network.

The Mechanics of Real-Time Asset Tracking

Tracking an aircraft or a ship is often viewed as a task for government agencies, but the infrastructure is entirely open. The primary technologies involved, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) for aircraft and the Automatic Identification System (AIS) for maritime vessels, were designed for safety and collision avoidance. They were never designed for privacy.

These systems rely on transponders that broadcast identity, position, and velocity in the clear. Because these signals operate on specific radio frequencies, anyone with a cheap Software Defined Radio (SDR) can capture them. The research presented highlights how platforms like ADS-B Exchange aggregate this data from thousands of volunteers worldwide. Unlike commercial flight trackers that redact data based on business agreements or owner requests, these community-driven platforms provide raw, unfiltered telemetry.

For a pentester, this is a goldmine. If you are tasked with a physical security assessment or a red team engagement involving a high-profile target, you do not need to compromise their internal systems to know where they are. You simply need their tail number or their vessel’s MMSI. Once you have that, you can monitor their movements in real-time, identifying their arrival at specific locations long before they step off the tarmac or the gangway.

Correlating Signals with Social Media

The real power of this research lies in the correlation of signal data with social media activity. Individuals often broadcast their own location through photos of boarding passes, vehicle license plates, or even the view from a hotel window.

The speakers demonstrated a workflow where they used Sherlock to map a target’s digital footprint across multiple platforms. By identifying a target’s username, they could cross-reference their social media posts with the telemetry data from ADS-B or AIS. If a target posts a photo of their lunch on Instagram, and you can identify the location or the context of their travel, you can match that timestamp against the flight paths of private jets in the vicinity.

This technique effectively deanonymizes the owner of a private aircraft. Even if the plane is registered to a shell company, the social media activity of the primary user provides the link. The WhatIsMyName tool is particularly effective here for finding linked accounts, which often contain the missing pieces of the puzzle.

The Role of VSAT and Radio Signals

Beyond standard telemetry, the talk explored the use of WebSDR to intercept live radio communications. Many maritime vessels and remote facilities use VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) for connectivity. While the data itself might be encrypted, the metadata and the signal patterns can reveal operational status.

By tuning into the frequencies used by these terminals, an investigator can determine if a vessel is active or if it is transmitting data, which can be a proxy for human activity on board. This is not about breaking encryption; it is about traffic analysis. If you see a spike in signal activity at 3:00 AM, you know something is happening on that ship.

Practical Implications for Pentesters

During a red team engagement, this OSINT workflow should be a standard part of your reconnaissance. If your target is a corporation, look for the executive team’s travel patterns. If you are testing a facility, look for the delivery vehicles or private transport used by the staff.

The impact of this intelligence is significant. It allows for highly targeted social engineering. If you know exactly when a target is arriving at a specific airport, you can craft a phishing email or a pretext call that is contextually perfect. You are not guessing; you are operating on verified, real-time data.

Defensive Considerations

Defending against this level of tracking is difficult because the data is broadcast by design. For organizations, the only real mitigation is operational security. Executives and high-value personnel should be trained to avoid posting real-time location data. Furthermore, companies should consider using LADD (Limiting Aircraft Data Displayed) programs to restrict the broadcasting of their flight data, though this is only effective against commercial aggregators, not the raw, community-sourced feeds.

Ultimately, the barrier to entry for this kind of tracking has collapsed. The tools are free, the data is public, and the methodology is straightforward. If you are not accounting for this in your threat models, you are missing a massive piece of the modern attack surface. Start looking at the signals your targets are broadcasting, because if you can see them, so can everyone else.